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Abstract
In the wake of the 2004 presidential election, supporters of Senator John Kerry’s candidacy searched for
explanations of voter behavior. The Kerry campaign succeeded in turning out record numbers of low-income
voters. Kerry strategists predicted that these voters would hold incumbent President George W. Bush
responsible for a decline in their personal economic well-being. Kerry attempted to facilitate this electoral
behavior by offering what he believed to be an economic plan attractive to low-income voters. The pocketbook
theory of voting underpinned this strategy. This theory asserts that voters consider the perceived impact
which an incumbent has had on their personal economic well-being when deciding to cast their vote. This
paper models the 2004 presidential election to determine if voters considered their personal economic well-
being when casting their vote. The results suggest that personal economic well-being was significant in
determining vote choice, with lower income voters marginally more likely to cast their vote for Kerry.
However, this effect was mitigated by voters’ race and gender.
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I.  The 2004 Presidential Election 
 The 2004 presidential election elicited greater public interest than any other 
national election in recent memory.  Official tallies of voter turnout revealed the highest 
turnout (60.7%) since the 1968 election, and the proliferation of “527” groups combined 
with the fever-pitch passions embraced on both sides of the aisle resulted in the most 
expensive campaigns in political history (Faler, 2005).   
 The election pitted incumbent Republican President George W. Bush against 
Democratic challenger Senator John Kerry.  Bush campaigned hard on his record in the 
War on Terrorism, and his image as a strong, resolute leader.  A Gallup Poll conducted 
between November 7-10, 2004, indicates that voters approved of Bush’s performance in 
the War on Terrorism by a 60% to 37% margin (Gallup, 2004).  Bush downplayed 
economic issues, where voters tended to give him lower marks, attempting to keep the 
campaign focused on matters of national security where he enjoyed an advantage in the 
public’s eye.   
 The Bush administration’s mixed economic record opened the door for criticism.  
During the Bush administration’s first term, private sector payrolls contracted by 1.6 
million jobs, and overall non-farm employment dropped by more than 800,000 jobs.  
Further, employed workers realized sluggish wage growth, and a decrease in real wages 
relative to national income.  The Congressional Joint Economic Committee reported that 
wages as a share of national income fell by over two percentage points during Bush’s 
first term in office.  Further, real median household income fell by over $1,500 over that 
time period (JEC, 2004).   
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 Relative changes in other contributions to individual economic well-being added 
to the economic stresses many working-class families experienced.  An additional 5.2 
million Americans joined the ranks of citizens without health insurance, bringing the total 
to 45 million Americans lacking coverage (Joint Economic Committee, 2004).  
Additionally, the Bush administration’s fiscal policy strapped the nation with 
increasingly large budget deficits, including a $413 billion federal deficit in fiscal year 
2004.  The Gallup Poll Organization reports that during the election, Americans 
disapproved of Bush’s handling of the economy, 51-47.  Further, Gallup reports that 
Americans disapproved of Bush’s health care policy, 57-47 (Gallup, 2004).  While these 
poll results are imprecise tools used to grasp public opinion, they nevertheless suggest a 
relative dissatisfaction among voters over Bush’s handling of the economy.   
In an attempt to capitalize on this perceived weakness, the Kerry campaign 
focused largely on domestic issues.  Kerry highlighted the mixed record of the economy 
under the Bush administration, and its impact on the economic well-being of individual 
voters.  In light of this, the Kerry campaign labored to provide a more economically-
attractive alternative to voters.  The economic plank of the Kerry platform included tax 
relief targeted to the working class, health care assistance from the federal government, 
and an education plan designed to make a college education affordable to more people 
(Kerry and Edwards, 2004).   
Kerry assumed that voters would respond to their individual economic well-being 
when making their vote choice, and hold President Bush accountable at the polls.  The 
pocketbook theory of voting underlies this assumption.  The pocketbook theory of voting 
asserts that voters consider their individual economic well-being when casting their vote, 
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and voters will hold incumbents responsible for how their decisions influence voters’ 
expected economic well-being.   
Kerry’s campaign labored to register and turnout large numbers of working-class 
voters, with the assumption that these voters would be most responsive to their economic 
situations, and therefore more easily persuaded by Kerry’s campaign message to hold 
Bush accountable for enacting negative changes to their personal economic well-being.  
Kerry supporters succeeded in turning out greater numbers of working-class voters to 
vote than in any other recent election, and early exit polls predicted a Kerry victory 
(Wiener, 2005).   
 The election results stunned the Kerry campaign.  Despite appealing to voters’ 
pocketbooks, and turning out record numbers of working-class voters, Kerry failed to win 
the election.  Bush won re-election by a margin of 51% to 48%, carrying the Electoral 
College with 286 of its 538 delegates. 
 The fervor with which many Kerry supporters worked during the campaign fed a 
search for explanations.  This paper attempts to explain the choices of voters in the 2004 
presidential election, focusing on the performance of the pocketbook theory of voting as 
the primary tool for analyzing voter behavior.   
II. Pocketbook Theory of Voting 
At the conclusion of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, a reporter asked 
Benjamin Franklin, “Mr. Franklin, sir, what have you wrought?”  Franklin replied, “A 
republic, if you can keep it.”  With these immortal words, Franklin charged the American 
public with the task of maintaining the nascent nation.  For more than two centuries, the 
4
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American people have fulfilled their obligation, flocking to the polls every four years to 
elect a new president, and keep alive the American republic.   
 That process by which voters sustain the republic has elicited a yawning volume 
of academic literature.  While political scientists and theorists assumed center stage in the 
early debate surrounding the democratic process, the academic world is slowly granting 
greater deference to the lessons suggested by economic theory. 
 Economic theory first emerged on this shelf of literature in 1957 when Anthony 
Downs published his seminal work, “An Economic Theory of Democracy” (Downs, 
1957).  The introduction of the rational actor model into the study of the democratic 
process proved to be Downs’ lasting contribution.  Downs asserted that both governments 
and voters are rational actors attempting to maximize utility with respect to their 
constraints.   
The assumption of the rational voter sparked a flurry of economic analysis of 
elections.  While Downs asserted that voters were attempting to maximize their overall 
general welfare, many scholars streamlined his hypothesis to predict that individuals 
would vote to maximize their personal financial well-being.   
 This streamlined hypothesis gained the monicker the pocketbook theory of voting.  
This theory refers to the propensity to cast a vote for or against an incumbent based upon 
his perceived impact on one’s personal economic well-being (Sigelman, 1991).  The 
academic literature discusses two methods of measuring the pocketbook theory’s 
implications, with some studies employing experimental evidence, and others examining 
observed voting behavior. 
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 Sigelman, Sigelman and Bullock find experimental evidence in support of 
economic voting and the pocketbook theory.  In this study, the authors asked 288 
undergraduate students how they would cast their vote for an incumbent presidential 
candidate.  The authors presented participants with different circumstances under which 
the incumbent president’s policies had impacted their personal financial situation in 
different ways.  The authors elected to use undergraduate students for the study, because 
previous literature found that many undergraduate students do not often consider personal 
economic interest when considering political issues.  Therefore, the authors argued that 
this experimental test would subject the pocketbook theory to its most difficult subjects.   
The study reported that respondents behaved consistently with the pocketbook 
theory.  “Pocketbook voting was very much in evidence in our factorial survey—
extraordinarily in evidence, when it is considered that our experimental subjects were 
given only hypothetical economic motivations to vote for one candidate or the other” 
(Sigelman, Sigelman, and Bullock, 1991).  
David W. Romero and Stephen J Stambough use survey data on respondents’ 
actual vote choice from congressional elections from 1980 through 1990.  Romero and 
Stambough control for respondent partisanship, and find that evaluations of personal 
economic circumstances exerted a significant influence over a respondent’s decision to 
vote for the incumbent.  More specifically, they found that when voters believed that an 
incumbent had negatively affected their economic well-being, they were marginally less 
likely to vote for them, ceteris paribus.  This finding was statistically significant, and 
lends further support to the pocketbook theory (Romero and Stambough, 1996).         
6
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In a separate article, Sigelman finds evidence of pocketbook voting across all 
major religious groups-Catholics, Protestants and Jews, during the 1980, 1984 and 1988 
presidential elections (Sigelman, 1991).  Sigelman models vote choice in these elections 
to determine if a perceived change in a respondent’s financial situation influenced their 
decision to vote for or against the incumbent.  Sigelman controls for different 
demographic and political variables that have an independent effect on vote choice, 
including respondents’ gender, age, education, income, political ideology and party 
identification (Sigelman, 1991).   
Clem Brooks and David Brady model the presidential elections from 1952 to 
1996, to determine whether household income is a significant factor in explaining vote 
choice.  The authors analyze data from the National Election Studies’ surveys of voting 
behavior during these presidential elections.  They control for demographic, political and 
regional variables that independently affect vote choice, including respondent race (a 
dummy variable assuming a value of one if the respondent is African American, and zero 
otherwise), gender, age, education and region.  The authors find that household income is 
statistically significant in explaining vote choice, and suggest that their findings lend 
further support to the pocketbook theory.  Moreover, Brooks and Brady find that, ceteris 
paribus, an increase in respondent household income increases their likelihood of voting 
for a Republican presidential candidate (Brooks and Brady, 1999).   
 James E. Campbell models presidential elections from 1948 through 1988.  While 
Campbell does not test for evidence of the pocketbook theory, his model nevertheless 
provides a helpful framework for modeling a presidential election.  Campbell observes 
percentage of the two-party statewide vote as his dependent variable.  Campbell controls 
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for many of the independent variables discussed in the other studies, including state 
partisanship and ideology.  However, Campbell employs a broad range of regional 
variables in his model, including the South, New England, Rocky Mountain, North 
Central and the President’s home-state as different regional dummy variables in his 
model (Campbell, 1992).  This model emphasizes the importance of regional 
characteristics on determining voter behavior.  This paper draws heavily from Campbell’s 
discussion of regional influences, and builds upon his regional observations.   
 The predictions of the pocketbook theory hold significant implications for public 
policy and the political landscape of the United States.  First, if the electorate evaluates 
political leaders based upon the impact their policies have on voters’ individual economic 
well-being, then that will influence the incentives for political leaders when crafting 
public policy and their campaign strategy.  Politicians will have increased incentives to 
implement more proactive policies, designed to improve the economic well-being of 
individual voters, and ultimately win their electoral support.  Furthermore, the pocket 
book theory may aid politicians in identifying sympathetic constituencies according to 
socio-economic status. 
The theoretical legitimacy of the pocketbook theory of voting attracts widespread 
academic support.  However, its relevance in the 2004 presidential election is thus far 
unclear.  In building upon the existing body of literature concerning the pocketbook 
theory of voting, this paper tries to explain voter behavior in the 2004 presidential 
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III.  Model 
Vote for Kerry=β0+β1Adjhhincome+β2African American+β3Asian+ β4Male+ 
β5Ideology+β6Religiosity+ β7Urban+β8Northeast+β9Westcoast+β10South+     
β11Mid-Atlantic+ β12Southwest+β13Plains+β14Rocky Mountain+  
β15WildWest+β16Education+β17Adjhhincome*White+β18Adjhhincome*Male 
 My model attempts to test the extent to which voters behaved consistently with 
the predictions of the pocketbook theory in the 2004 presidential election.  The 
pocketbook theory suggests that voters who perceived that President Bush’s policies had 
a negative impact on their economic well-being would be marginally less likely to vote 
for his re-election.  I predict that this effect would be aided by the Kerry campaign’s 
strategy of appealing to voters’ “pocketbooks”, and making economic well-being a 
marquee election issue.   
My model assumes that voters with lower incomes experienced a general decline 
in economic well-being during Bush’s first term.  The reasons for this assumption were 
discussed earlier in the paper, and concern relative changes to assumed inputs of  low-
income voters’ personal welfare functions.  This paper does not attempt to assign blame 
to Bush for these trends, that is beyond the scope of this paper.  Rather, this paper 
assumes that low-income voters held these perceptions of Bush’s impact on their personal 
economic situation, and does not attempt to explain whether these perceptions were 
indeed justified.  Therefore, my model predicts that, ceteris paribus, as a voter’s income 
goes down, they would be marginally more likely to vote for Kerry.    
Furthermore, my model assumes that voters had perfect information of the two 
candidate’s economic policies, and possessed the ability to discern which candidate’s 
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economic policies would benefit them more directly.  Essentially, I assume the Downsian 
notion that voters are rational actors with perfect information. 
The dependent variable in my model is the percentage of the two-party vote in the 
2004 presidential election going to Senator John Kerry.  I decided to use the percentage 
of the two-party vote to eliminate the influence of third-party candidates.  Due to the 
minimal influence of third-party candidates in the 2004 election, this approach does not 
present significant problems when estimating the model, and allows for easier 
interpretation of its results.  Further, using the two-party vote is a widely-accepted 
practice throughout the academic literature predicting presidential elections.  Daniel 
Eisenberg and Jonathan Ketcham model every presidential election from 1972 through 
2000 to find evidence of economic voting.  Eisenberg and Ketcham also use percentage 
of the two-party vote as their dependent variable in their model (Eisenberg and Ketcham, 
2004).  Additionally, James E. Campbell employs this method when he models 
presidential elections from 1948 through 1988 (Campbell, 1992).   
I gathered data on election results from the personal website of Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Professor Charles Stewart III.  Stewart is a well-respected source 
on voting data, and makes available for public use his own collection of data.  I observed 
this variable at the county-level, measuring what percentage of the two-party vote Kerry 
received in each county in the U.S.  This is the smallest level at which I can collect voting 
data, and it allows for the highest degree of micro-level analysis of voting behavior.  
While observing this variable at the individual voter level would be ideal, these data are 
not available. 
10
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My model employs a host of independent variables to explain the myriad 
influences affecting vote choice in the presidential election.  This model loosely follows 
the frameworks set forth by Brooks and Brady (1999), Campbell (1992) and Sigelman 
(1991).  All data for the independent variables are taken from the 2000 United States 
Census Statistical Abstract unless otherwise noted. 
The first independent variable in my model serves as a proxy for economic well-
being.  This variable measures the median household income of a county, measured in 
constant 1999 dollars.  This variable is also adjusted for average household size of a 
county, to control for variance in number of persons occupying a household across 
different counties.  Brooks and Brady use household income as their measure of 
economic well-being in their 1999 study of presidential election.  Brooks and Brady 
assert, “household income is a preferable starting point given that individual household 
members benefit by the presence of income earned by other members (individuals’ 
earnings may underestimate their available income and thus the political effects of 
income)” (Brooks and Brady, 1999).   
I would expect that as adjusted median household income of a county increases, 
the percentage of the two-party vote going to Kerry will decrease.  Therefore, I expect 
this variable to have a negative sign.  The Kerry campaign deliberately crafted economic 
proposals designed to improve the economic well-being of lower-income voters.  
Assuming that these voters are rational actors, and respond according to the predictions 
of the pocketbook theory of voting, lower-income voters will be marginally more likely 
to vote for Kerry, ceteris paribus. 
11
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The next independent variable in my model controls for the influence of African 
American voters in a county.  This variable measures the percentage of the total 
population of a county that is African American.  Brooks and Brady include a measure of 
percentage of African Americans in their model as well.  Historically, African Americans 
have comprised a more liberal block of voters, and they have formed one of the core 
constituencies of the Democratic Party.  Therefore, I expect that as the percentage of 
African Americans within a county increases, the percentage of the two-party vote going 
to Kerry will also increase.  
The third independent variable in my model controls for the number of Hispanics 
in a county.  This variable measures the percentage of the total population of a county 
that self-identifies as Hispanic.  While most of the academic literature discussing 
presidential election models does not include a measure of Hispanics, I felt that the 
changing national political landscape warranted inclusion of this variable.  Hispanics 
comprise one of the fastest-growing minority groups in the United States, and both 
parties have actively sought to court their votes.  I expect that as the percentage of 
Hispanics in a county increases, the percentage of the two-party vote going to Kerry will 
likewise increase.  The Democratic Party traditionally adopted a more liberal stance 
toward immigration and civil rights.  Therefore, I expect Hispanics to be marginally more 
likely to support Kerry. 
The fourth independent variable in my model controls for the number of Asians in 
a county.  This variable measures the percentage of the total population of a county that 
self-identifies as Asian.  The academic literature discussing presidential election models 
does not include a measure of Asians.  However, I felt that the growing Asian population 
12
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comprises an increasingly important voting block.  I expect that like Hispanics, Asian 
voters will be marginally more sympathetic to the civil rights stances of the Democratic 
Party.  Therefore, I decided to include a variable controlling for the relative Asian 
population of a county, and I expect that as the percentage of Asians in a county 
increases, the percentage of the two-party vote going to Kerry will likewise increase. 
The fifth independent variable in my model controls for the relative number of 
males in a county.  This variable measures the percentage of a county’s total population 
that is male.  Sigelman, as well as Brooks and Brady both include measures of gender in 
their models.  Female voters typically vote more Democratic than their Republican-
leaning male counterparts.  In the 2000 election, Democratic nominee Al Gore carried 
women by 11 points.  Furthermore, female voters are traditionally more responsive to 
pocketbook issues (Romano, 2004).  Therefore, I expect that as the percentage of a 
county’s population that is male increases, the share of the two-party vote going to Kerry 
will decrease. 
The measurement of this variable presents some problems for the model.  Due to 
the availability of these demographic data only on the county-level, there is very little 
variance in this variable across counties.  Furthermore, due to the county-level 
measurement of this variable, it is impossible to observe intra-county variations of voting 
between the two genders.  Still, this was the best means of measuring this variable with 
the given data, and I include this variable in my model with the caveat that its results 
should be interpreted cautiously. 
The sixth independent variable in my model controls for the political ideology of 
a county’s voters.  This variable measures a composite political ideology score of each 
13
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state’s two senators from the National Journal magazine.  The National Journal rates 
every senator based on their votes cast on economic, social, and foreign policy.  I created 
a composite score of these three evaluations, and averaged the scores of the two senators 
from each state.  The scale ranged from most conservative (0) to most liberal (100) 
(National Journal, 2005).  The vast majority of voters perceived Kerry to be the more 
liberal candidate, and Bush to be the more conservative candidate.  Therefore, I would 
expect that as the ideology variable increased, the percentage of the two-party vote going 
to Kerry will also increase.   
The measurement of this variable presents several problems for the model.  First, 
while theory predicts that the votes cast by a state’s senators should appropriately reflect 
the political ideology of the state’s electorate, this ideal is often not realized in the U.S. 
Senate.  Rather, senators frequently stray from the ideological preferences of their voters 
to capture interest group money, earn favors from other elected officials, and express 
their personal ideological preferences.  Furthermore, the measurement of this variable 
treats the political ideology of voters as homogenous across every county within a state.  
This is obviously inaccurate.  However, this is the most accurate way that I could 
measure this variable given the available data.   
The seventh independent variable in my model controls for the religiosity of a 
county’s population.  This variable measures the percentage of people within a county 
who adhere to a religion.  Data for this variable are taken from researchers at the 
Glenmary Research Center in Nashville, TN.  Researchers surveyed 149 religious bodies 
in every county across the US, and had them self-report as to the number of adherents 
each organization had within each county.  While the study’s reliance upon self-reporting 
14
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introduces the opportunity for error and inconsistency within the study, the Glenmary 
Research Center is widely held up as a respectable source on national religious data.  
David Card and Enrico Moretti model the 2004 presidential election to test the reliability 
of touch-screen voting.  Card and Moretti control for the religiosity of states, and use the 
same data set from the Glenmary Research Center in constructing their variable 
measuring religiosity data (Card and Moretti, 2005).   
In the 2004 election, Bush lobbied hard to maintain the support of religious 
conservatives.  Bush took strong stands against gay marriage and abortion.  These 
ideological stances were regarded as more popular with many religious voters.  As a 
result, I would expect that as the percentage of people within a county who adhere to a 
religion increases, the percentage of the two-party vote going to Kerry would decrease, 
ceteris paribus.   
The measurement of this variable also presents some problems for the model.  
First, as previously discussed, the study’s reliance on religious bodies to self-report their 
number of adherents increases the likelihood of both measurement error and 
inconsistency, as different bodies undoubtedly maintain different criteria for membership.  
Furthermore, the measurement of this variable treats all religious persons as being 
equally and similarly responsive to the religious-based campaign appeals Bush made 
during the election.  However, religious persons possess starkly different social and 
religious views across religious sects and even within individual religions.  Lastly, many 
individuals do not consider their personal religious beliefs when casting their vote, or at 
least do not believe that religion should influence public policy decisions.     
15
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The eighth independent variable in my model controls for the urban influence of a 
county.  This variable measures the percentage of persons within a county living in an 
urban area, as defined by the US Census Bureau.  I would expect that as the percentage of 
persons living in an urban area increases, so will the percentage of the two-party vote 
going to Kerry.   
The ninth through sixteenth independent variables in my model control for 
regional influences.  Most academics acknowledge that beyond controlling for various 
demographic and political variables, it is important to consider inherent differences that 
different regions of the country possess.  These influences can be expressed through 
prevailing social attitudes of a region, as well as certain advantages that politicians hold 
due to a personal connection which they may have with a region of the country.  
Furthermore, these regional variables attempt to capture different partisan preferences 
which certain regions may have at different levels of representation.  For example, voters 
in North Dakota have reelected two relatively moderate Democratic Senators to represent 
them in the United States Senate.  However, North Dakota has voted for the Republican 
candidate in every Presidential election since 1968.  Campbell breaks down the United 
States into five different regions in his 1992 model (Campbell, 1992).  I decided to add an 
additional four regions into my model, to reflect changing partisan and social attitudes 
across the nation.  To see a complete list of the regional variables, consult Table 1. 
I dropped from my model the dummy variable controlling for regional influences 
of the upper Midwest.  Campbell also includes a dummy variable controlling for regional 
influences in the upper Midwest.  Likewise, Brooks and Brady include a Midwest 
variable in their model, but decide to drop this variable.  Doing so makes the Midwest the 
16
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baseline for the regional variables, so the marginal influence of each regional dummy 
variable is measured with respect to the upper Midwest region.  I choose to drop the 
upper Midwest dummy variable to make it my regional baseline as well.  The upper 
Midwest region is characteristically moderate, and serves as a good middle point from 
which to evaluate the other more partisan regions of the nation. 
I expect the Northeastern regional variable to have a positive sign.  In the past 
four presidential elections, only once has one of these states not cast its electoral votes for 
the Democratic candidate.1  Campbell also includes a dummy variable controlling for 
New England regional influences, due to the Democratic shift experienced throughout 
this region.  Campbell finds that New England states are marginally more likely to vote 
for the Democratic presidential candidate, and that result is statistically significant 
(Campbell, 1992).  I decided to expand upon Campbell’s variable to include New York, 
New Jersey and Delaware, because these states have likewise grown increasingly 
Democratic since Campbell’s work in 1992.  
I expect the West Coast regional variable to have a positive sign.  These three 
states tend to adopt a more socially liberal attitude, and consistently vote Democratic in 
Presidential elections.  Since the 1988 Presidential election, only once has one of these 
states not cast its electoral votes for the Democratic candidate (Leip, 2005). 
I expect the South regional variable to have a negative sign.  Since the 1960s, the 
once solidly Democratic South has grown increasingly Republican.  Campbell controls 
for this partisan realignment with a regional variable for the Southern states.  Campbell 
finds that Southern states are marginally less likely to vote for the Democratic 
                                                 
1 In the 2000 Presidential Election, New Hampshire cast its 4 electoral votes for the Republican candidate 
George W. Bush. 
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presidential candidate, and that result is statistically significant (Campbell, 1992).  
Included in this category are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee.   
I expect the mid-Atlantic regional variable to have a negative sign.  These states 
generally espouse more moderately conservative political views, and they have alternated 
fairly consistently between Democratic and Republican Presidential candidates over the 
past six presidential elections (Leip).  However, I predict that the mild strain of cultural 
conservatism present in this region will, on the margin, tip voters slightly more in favor 
of Bush.   
The states included in the Southwestern regional variable tend to be moderately 
conservative, and almost uniformly favor a smaller role for the federal government.  I 
expect that this variable will have a negative sign. 
Plains states vote overwhelmingly Republican in Presidential elections, and have 
cultivated a very strong streak of social and religious conservatism over the past four 
decades.  I expect that voters in this region will be marginally less likely to vote for 
Kerry, and I expect this variable to have a negative sign.   
Likewise, Rocky Mountain states have also cultivated a fierce social 
conservatism, as well as adopting a strong belief in a smaller role for the federal 
government.  I expect that voters in this region will be marginally less likely to vote for 
Kerry, and I expect this variable to have a negative sign. 
Campbell includes regional variables accounting for a home-state bonus for a 
presidential candidate.  Further, Campbell includes a “friends and neighbors” variable as 
well, controlling for the added bonus which presidential candidates often receive from 
18
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neighbors of their home states (Campbell, 1992).  Bush was fond of discussing his tenure 
as Governor of Texas, as well as his ranch in Crawford, Texas.  I expect that voters in 
Texas and Oklahoma will respond favorably to this personal connection, and be 
marginally less likely to vote for Kerry.  Therefore, I expect that the Wild West variable 
will have a negative sign. 
I dropped Hawaii, Alaska, Virginia and the District of Columbia from my model.  
The District of Columbia is almost uniformly dropped from the models discussed in the 
academic literature, due to its uncharacteristic qualities.  The District is overwhelmingly 
urban, African American and Democratic, and largely considered to be an outlier.  
Therefore, I did not include it in my model, and do not expect that its exclusion will 
prove problematic for the model. 
The three states dropped from the model were done so when difficulties arose in 
attempting to match 2000 Census data with 2004 election data.  These three states all 
underwent significant redistricting in this four year period, thereby altering pre-existing 
boundaries.  As a result, it was not possible to match voting data with demographic data 
on the county level, and they could not be included as observations. 
 It is unclear precisely what effect excluding these states will have on the results of 
my model.  Omitting these states will decrease the sample size of the model by 181 
observations.  However, the sample size of the model still includes 2973 observations, 
providing enough degrees of freedom for estimation, and adequate observations from 
which to make valid statistical inferences. 
 However, the question remains whether counties in Virginia, Alaska and Hawaii 
are qualitatively different from counties in the broader population.  If so, omitting these 
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counties will bias the sample, potentially in a manner that will adversely affect the 
model’s results.   
 I expect that Alaska and Hawaii will be qualitatively different than states in the 
mainland United States.  The economies of these two states are structurally very different 
from the other 48 states, and their geographic dislocation likely creates differences in 
culture and information flows.  I expect these two states to be qualitatively different from 
the other 48, and I expect that dropping these two states will bias my results.  
Nevertheless, Hawaii and Alaska are generally considered unimportant states in 
presidential elections.  Hawaii has cast its electoral votes for the Democratic candidate in 
every Presidential Election since 1988, and Alaska has cast its electoral votes for the 
Republican candidate in every Presidential Election since 1968 (Leip, 2005).  
Furthermore, during the 2004 Presidential Election, neither candidate devoted 
considerable resources to persuading the voters in either of these states.  Therefore, 
because of its relative political unimportance, I expect that the results of the model will 
indeed be more politically applicable if I only analyze the lower 48 states. 
 I do not expect that in dropping the state of Virginia my data set loses very many 
qualitatively unique observations.  Virginia shares economic and cultural similarities with 
its neighboring states in the South and Mid-Atlantic regions.  While losing the well-
educated and liberal-leaning counties in northern Virginia may exclude observations of 
interest, there are several other urban areas with high levels of educated people in the 
South.  For example, the Raleigh-Durham area in North Carolina also acts as a Southern 
sub-region with high levels of well-educated, liberal people in an urban setting.  I expect 
that losing these observations in northern Virginia will under-represent this type of 
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county, and I expect that this will bias my results.  More specifically, the Southern 
variable may be marginally less in favor of Kerry than it otherwise would be with the 
inclusion of these northern Virginia counties.   
 Nonetheless, I drop these three states-Hawaii, Alaska and Virginia with the caveat 
that this may bias my results, and future research should strive to include observations in 
these states to arrive at more conclusive results.  However, dropping these observations 
decreases my data set by only six percent.  Therefore, I expect any bias created by 
omitting these observations to be minimal. 
 The seventeenth variable in my model controls for the influence of education on 
vote choice.  This variable uses Census data to measure the percentage of a county that 
has attained a college degree or higher.  Both Sigelman and Brooks and Brady include 
controls for education in their respective models.  Sigelman finds that education is 
significant in explaining Catholic and Protestant vote choice in Presidential Elections in 
both 1984 and 1988 (Sigelman, 1991).  In all cases, higher levels of education were 
consistent with higher levels of support for the Democratic candidate.  Therefore, I 
expect that higher levels of education will cause voters to be marginally more likely to 
cast their vote for Kerry.   
My model employs two interaction terms to further explore the influence of a 
voter’s economic situation on his vote choice.  The first interaction term attempts to 
measure the indirect effects of race on the pocketbook voting theory.  The Glenmary 
Research Center in Nashville, Tennessee analyzed the major constituencies of Bush and 
Kerry in the aftermath of the election.  The Center found that overall, foreign policy and 
economic concerns were more important to the electorate.  However, among Bush’s core 
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constituents, social and religious issues were most important.  Meanwhile, among Kerry’s 
core constituents, economic issues were most important.  Also, the Center found that 
white Evangelical Christians, as well as white “other” Christians formed one of Bush’s 
core constituencies (Green, 2004).  Lastly, male voters preferred Bush by a margin of 55 
to 44 percent over Kerry (Bennett, 2004). 
 Most of Bush’s core constituents placed a lower emphasis on economic issues, 
and were therefore marginally less likely to act according to the pocketbook theory.  As a 
result, I expect that white voters and male voters will be marginally less likely to respond 
to their personal economic situation when casting their vote. 
 To measure this affect, I include two interaction terms.  The first measures the 
joint effect of race and adjusted household income on vote choice.  This variable 
multiplies the two independent variables capturing adjusted household income and 
percentage of a county’s population that is white.  I expect that lower-income white 
voters will be marginally less likely to vote for Kerry, because they do not place great 
importance on economic matters when casting their vote. 
 The second interaction term measures the joint effect of gender and adjusted 
household income on vote choice.  This term multiplies the two independent variables 
capturing adjusted household income and percentage of a county which is male.  I expect 
that lower-income males will be marginally less likely to vote for Kerry, because, like 
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IV.  Regression Diagnostics 
A.  Model Performance 
 The F-test evaluates the overall statistical significance of a model.  According to 
an F-test, the model is significant at the 99 percent confidence level.  Furthermore, the 
model’s adjusted R-squared value equals 0.472.  This result means that the model 
explains 47.2% of the variation in the dependent variable.  These two statistical 
measurements imply that the model is significant, and demonstrates strong explanatory 
power (Studenmund, 2006). 
B. Heteroskedasticity 
Heteroskedasticity occurs when the error term is not distributed with constant 
variance (Studenmund 345-6, 2006).  Heteroskedasticity frequently arises from a 
specification error, commonly omitted variable bias.  As a result, coefficient estimates 
may be biased.  Furthermore, heteroskedasticity increases the variances of the coefficient 
estimate distributions.  This causes OLS to underestimate the variances of the 
coefficients, artificially inflating t-scores.  As a result, t-tests may not be valid 
(Studenmund 354, 2006). 
The White Test is a general test to see if heteroskedasticity is present in the 
model.  While it reveals nothing about the nature and cause of heteroskedasticity, it is a 
good starting point for evaluating the presence of heteroskedasticity in the model.  To 
perform the test, the initial regression was run, and then the error terms were collected.  
Next, an auxiliary regression was constructed, and included the independent variables, 
their squared terms, and all interaction terms.  The White Test attempts to determine if 
these additional terms will explain the errors.  The error terms should never be explained 
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by any variables, because they should be randomly distributed.  Therefore, if these terms 
do indeed explain the errors, then the model exhibits heteroskedasticity.   
My model fails to pass the White Test at the 95 percent confidence level.  
Therefore, I decided to run my regression a second time, using robust standard errors to 
estimate my model.  This estimation technique employs statistical devices to correct for 
the heteroskedasticity present in my model.  Therefore, I can interpret my coefficient 
estimates and test-statistics confident that my model does not possess heteroskedastic 
bias.   
  C.  Multicollinearity 
To test for the presence of multicollinearity in my model, I measured the Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIF) of the independent variables.  The VIF measures to what extent 
each variable is explained by the others, and hence exhibits multicollinearity.  VIF scores 
below 5 are considered to be non-problematic.  When I dropped the two interaction terms 
from my model, then all of the VIF scores were below 5.  As a result, my independent 
variables did not exhibit a significant degree of multicollinearity.  Upon including the two 
interaction terms in my model, the VIF scores of the variables included in the interaction 
terms increased beyond 5.  This result is expected, because the interaction terms are 
collinear with other included variables in the model by design.  Therefore, 
multicollinearity is not a concern in my model. 
D. Parameter Estimates 
The coefficient estimates of 18 of the 19 independent variables in the model 
assumed their expected direction, and were statistically significant at the 99 percent 
confidence level.  For complete parameter results, consult Table 2.  The coefficient 
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estimate of the adjusted household income variable is consistent with the predictions of 
the pocketbook theory of voting.  This estimate implies that, ceteris paribus, every one 
dollar increase in the adjusted median household income of a county will decrease that 
county’s percentage vote for Kerry by .004 points.  As a result, we can infer that counties 
with more lower-income voters voted more strongly for Kerry, ceteris paribus.  This 
result also suggests that perhaps lower-income voters voted against the incumbent 
President Bush based on their perceptions of the incumbent’s impact on their economic 
well-being.  
The pocketbook effect was somewhat mitigated, however, by a voter’s gender and 
race.  The overall marginal influence of adjusted household income can be found on 
Table 3.  The direct effect of adjusted household income causes lower-income voters to 
vote more strongly for Kerry.  However, when controlling for the indirect effects of 
gender and race, we see that this effect is mitigated.  Table 3 outlines the interaction of 
these two variables with adjusted household income, and while the mitigation is minimal, 
it is nonetheless statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. 
The one coefficient estimate that did not assume the expected sign was the west 
coast regional variable.  Instead, voters in these states were marginally less likely to vote 
for Kerry, ceteris paribus.  The results of the rest of the regional variables seem to lend 
support to the notion of a blue state versus red state divide.   
V.  Discussion 
 The model’s results are generally consistent with the pocketbook theory of voting.  
In the aggregate, lower-income voters were marginally more likely to cast their vote for 
Kerry.  However, this effect was neither absolute nor universal.  Rather, both the gender 
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and ethnicity of a voter exerted an indirect influence over the effect of personal economic 
well-being on vote choice.  White voters and male voters were both marginally less 
responsive to the pocketbook influence.  Additionally, these voters were generally more 
responsive to religious and social concerns in casting their vote (Green, et al, 2004). 
 The results of this model suggest that the Kerry campaign’s strategy of appealing 
to the pocketbooks of all lower-income voters may have been appropriate as a broad 
theme.  However, the results of the model suggest that not all lower-income voters share 
similar policy preferences, and respond to their personal economic well-being in varying 
levels.  Therefore, future campaigns would be wise to target their pocketbook themes to 
specific sub-groups of voters.  The results suggest that non-white and female voters will 
be marginally more responsive to pocketbook appeals than other members of the 
electorate. 
 The model possesses numerous shortcomings, and future empirical research is 
necessary before any firm campaign prescriptions may be offered.  First, the 
measurement of several variables casts doubt on the validity of the results.  The 
measurement of the male variable at the county level limited the variance of this variable, 
and prohibited intra-county analysis of voting trends.  The measurement of the political 
ideology variable at the state-wide level introduces numerous problems previously 
discussed in this paper.  Lastly, the measurement of the religiosity variable introduces the 
possibility for significant error and inconsistency. 
 The voting data are all observed on November 4, 2004.  However, the 
demographic data are all taken from the 2000 US Census Statistical Abstract.  As a result, 
this four year mismatch will not capture demographic and population changes in the US 
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since the 2000 Census.  While I do not expect that there have been any significant large-
scale trend changes in the past four years, this mismatch is nonetheless problematic at the 
margin. 
 Every presidential election features unique candidates with their own set of 
personal qualities.  This model analyzes one specific presidential election with its two 
unique candidates.  Therefore, any efforts to apply these results to other national elections 
should be done so cautiously, for it is unclear to what extent these results are dependent 
upon the unique qualities of Bush and Kerry. 
 Lastly, the model assumes that voters are rational actors with perfect information, 
and that Kerry’s economic platform was more attractive to lower-income voters.  These 
assumptions are necessary in order to test the pocketbook theory, though they 
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Region States Included Expected Sign 
Northeast MA, ME, NH, VT, CT, RI, NY, NJ, DE Positive 
West Coast CA, OR, WA Positive 
South AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN Negative 
Mid-Atlantic KT, MD, PA, WV Negative 
Southwest AZ, CO, NV, NM Negative 
Plains KS, MO, NE, ND, SD Negative 
Rocky Mountain ID, MT, UT, WY Negative 
Wild West TX, OK Negative 
   
Dropped from model: HI, AK, VA, DC 
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Rocky Mountain -13.5572 
(0.9987) 
-13.57*** 















Adjusted R2 0.4724  
F-Statistic 141.05***  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Partial Derivative of Kerry with respect to Adjusted Household Income: 
β1+ β2White+ β3Male 
Marginal Influence=-0.0042+0.0000158*White +0.0000658*Male 
   
 Marginal Influence when Male, White=0 -0.0042 
 Marginal Influence when Male=1, White=1 -0.0041432 
 Marginal Influence when Male=0, White=1 -0.0041842 
 Marginal Influence when Male, White=1 -0.0041184 
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